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The privacy of communicating participants is often of paramount importance, but in some sit-
uations it is an essential condition. A typical example is a fair (secret) voting. We analyze in
detail communication privacy based on quantum resources, and we propose new quantum protocols.
Possible generalizations that would lead to voting schemes are discussed.
Every day people have to make important decisions
that should remain secret. Protecting the privacy of
those decisions, if their results are to be communicated,
can be a challenging problem. In this Letter we will con-
sider a special instance of multi-party decision making.
Consider a group of people who have to make a common
decision, i.e. choosing one of several possible (prescribed)
options. In many cases the fairest (democratic) way of
making the decision is to vote. Reliable voting protocols
should satisfy a number of conditions [1], three of which
are: i) security, ii) verifiability, and iii) privacy. The se-
curity condition guarantees that all users can influence
the result only by casting a single valid vote. That is,
each voter can vote just once (non-reusability), only le-
gitimate users can vote (eligibility) and no one can learn
any intermediate result (fairness). The strongest version
of the verifiability requirement is that each voter can ver-
ify the correctness of the result, however none of the vot-
ers is able to prove how he or she voted. This prevents
vote buying.
A voting scheme satisfying all properties except the
privacy condition is easy to implement. Privacy is re-
lated to the secrecy of the ballots, or equivalently to the
anonymity of the voters. Ideally, no one should be able to
tell how any of the voters voted. Such multi-party com-
munication protocol is known as secret, or anonymous
voting.
In the voting process the initial information Ii cre-
ated by voters (their votes) is transformed into the fi-
nal outcome corresponding to the information If . Usu-
ally Ii is much larger than If . The voting can be for-
malized as mapping V : X × . . . × X → Y , where
X,Y represent sets of individual voting options and a
set of final results, respectively. The input/output in-
formation can be expressed in terms of the cardinali-
ties of the sets X,Y , i.e. Ii = N log2 |X | (N is the
number of participants) and If = log2 |Y |. For exam-
ple, N parliamentarians during a voting procedure cre-
ate Ii = N log2 3 bits of information, given the choices:
X = {accept, refuse, abstain}. However, the final re-
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sult can be represented only by If = log2 3 bits with
Y = {acceptance, refusal, undecided}.
Hiding the identity of the voters seems to be very dif-
ficult to achieve, because the information can often be
traced back to its origin. In a public election the collected
paper ballots are mixed in a ballot box, which could en-
sure the anonymity of a voter. However, the ballots could
be marked in such a way that it is possible to identify the
voters. Thus perfect privacy no longer holds. The first
protocol to guarantee voting privacy (see Ref. [2]) was
based on the so-called MIX net machines. Since then
several secret voting protocols based on cryptographic
primitives such as anonymous broadcast [2] or blind sig-
natures [3, 4], have been proposed. Some of the prop-
erties of these protocols are even unconditionally secure,
and others are guaranteed in the computational sense,
i.e. they are based on one-way functions. David Chaum
[5] suggested a solution of the so-called dinning cryptog-
raphers problem that can be used to implement a secret
voting protocol. Let us briefly describe this procedure,
which guarantees unconditionally the anonymity of the
voters.
Three cryptographers are having a dinner in their fa-
vorite restaurant. After ordering their food, the waiter
comes and informs them that someone has already paid
for the dinner. The problem is to determine whether it
has been paid for by one of them, or by someone else
(for instance, by the NSA). The cryptographer who paid
(if indeed one of dinning cryptographers took care of the
bill) wants to remain anonymous. The three cryptogra-
phers can resolve the problem by using the following pro-
tocol: Each pair {j, k}; (j, k = 1, 2, 3) of cryptographers
toss a coin, i.e. they generate a random bit cjk. The
third cryptographer cannot see the result. Each cryptog-
rapher announces the logical (mod2) sum of the two bits
he shares, i.e., the cryptographer k announces the value
sk =
∑
j 6=k cjk, unless he is the one who paid for the din-
ner. The one who paid the bill announces the opposite
value, i.e. sk = 1 +
∑
j 6=k cjk. If the dinner was paid by
the NSA then
∑
k sk = 0. If not, then
∑
k sk = 1. The
identity of the potential payer remains completely secret.
This protocol can be easily extended to an arbitrary
number of users, and a slightly modified version can be
used for voting. Each pair of voters shares a random in-
2teger (key) |cjk| ≤ N , where cjk = −ckj . Each voter
chooses either vk = 0 (“no”) or vk = 1 (“yes”). He
broadcasts the message sk = vk +
∑
j 6=k cjk. Because
of cjk = −ckj it is valid that
∑
k sk =
∑
k vk. Finally,
each of the users can compute the sum and find out the
total number of the “yes” votes. Let us note that all
operations are modulo N . Privacy in this scheme is as-
sured, but the protocol is not secure and cheating is easy.
One cannot guarantee that voters will not “vote” an arbi-
trary number times vk ≤ N , i.e. the result can be easily
manipulated. However, there exists a modification that
solves this problem and provides security based on the
RSA protocol (for more details see Refs. [3, 5]).
We would now like to consider whether the paradigm
and tools of quantum (information) theory and in par-
ticular, the quantum cryptography [6] can help us imple-
ment tasks related to secret voting and maintaining the
anonymity of the voters.
The first analysis of identity protection based on quan-
tum protocols was performed by Christandl and Wehner
(see Ref. [7]), who used generalized GHZ states to anony-
mously broadcast not only classical bits, but also qubits.
Recently, two approaches (see Refs. [8] and [9]) to quan-
tum voting have been independently proposed. In Ref. [9]
Vaccaro et al. have proposed a scheme for quantum vot-
ing, in which the quantum protocol is used to ensure the
voter’s privacy. In their scheme, the voters and an au-
thority share an entangled state with a fixed number of
particles, N . This state is a superposition of states of
the form |N − n, n〉, where the the first number is the
number of particles possessed by the authority and the
second is the number of particles possessed by the vot-
ers. The number of yes votes in encoded in the relative
phases of the states making up the superposition. In
Ref. [8] quantum approaches towards privacy and voting
based on entangled qudit states have been discussed. The
quantum-voting protocol introduced there is the subject
of this paper. Both these protocols utilize similar re-
sources, i.e. the ballot (voting) state in both cases is a
maximally entangled state, and each voter registers his
vote by a local operation. On the other hand, the two ap-
proaches suggest different implementations of quantum
voting. Both will need further development.
A closely related problem of anonymous oblivious
transfer has been studied in Ref. [10]. The privacy prob-
lem is relatively new even in classical information theory.
It seems (at least intuitively) that quantum systems may
be more suitable and more efficient in achieving this goal.
Let us start with the analysis of the privacy and the
voting problem in the framework of quantum theory. Our
aim is to use quantum information to ensure privacy. In
principle, one can imagine two general schemes for a vot-
ing procedure: i) the distributed-ballots scheme (DB)
and ii) the travelling-ballot scheme (TB). In the DB a
voter obtains his own ballot, he or she performs voting
operation and sends the ballot back. The TB is a scheme
in which a single ballot/container is travelling (is sent)
between voters and everyone performs the voting opera-
tion on the same physical system. Both, the DB and the
TB scenarios can be formalized in the same way. Physi-
cally quantum voting is performed by transformations of
some quantum system. Let us denote by |Ω0〉 the initial
state of the system (the quantum ballot) and by U
(j)
k a
transformation performed by the jth user voting for the
option k ∈ X . After the voting has concluded, the ballot
is sent to the authority, who performs a measurement M
on the ballot. The outcome of the measurement r is asso-
ciated with the result of the voting, r ∈ Y . Let us denote
by ~v = (k1, . . . , kn) the particular collection of votes and
by V(~v) ∈ Y the result of the process of voting. After the
voting is completed the system is described by the state
|Ω~v〉 = U (n)kn . . . U
(1)
k1
|Ω0〉. The difference between these
two schemes is that in the DB scheme we work with a
composite system of N particles, and the operations for
different users mutually commute.
In what follows we will assume that the initial state
|Ω0〉 is pure and voting operations are represented by
unitary maps. The privacy of votes is reflected by the
following set of conditions
|〈Ω~v1 |Ω~v2〉| = 0, iff V(~v1) 6= V(~v2) ; (1)
|〈Ω~v1 |Ω~v2〉| = 1, iff V(~v1) = V(~v2) .
These conditions guarantee that finally only If bits of
information are available and the identity of the voters is
securely hidden. Our task is to find collections of voting
operations {U (j)k } and an initial state |Ω0〉 such that the
above conditions are satisfied. In what follows we will
simplify the task by assuming that each participant uses
the same collection of operations, i.e. U
(j)
k = U
(j′)
k ≡ Uk
for all j, j′ and all k.
Let us start by analyzing the simplest case of two vot-
ers. In this case the privacy property does not make much
sense, because after a public announcement of the re-
sult each voter can deduce how the other participant has
voted. However, it can be of interest to some third party,
particulary in the case of an undecided result, i.e. when
votes do not coincide. Let us consider the TB scheme
first. The set of possible results restricts from below the
dimension of the required quantum system, i.e. dimH ≥
|Y|. In our case Y = {acceptance, refusal, undecided}
and consequently at least a qutrit is needed to perform
the voting. Let us assume the state |Ω0〉 = |0〉 and vot-
ing transformations Uno = I and Uyes = U , where U is
defined via transformations |0〉 → |1〉 → |2〉 → |0〉. It
is easy to verify that Eqs. (1) are fulfilled, however this
system does not guarantee the secrecy of votes. In the
proposed protocol it is very easy to learn the actual state
of the voting, i.e. the intermediate result. One way to
avoid this problem is to use an authority who prepares
the initial state of the ballot and finally reads the result.
We shall now show how this can protect voter privacy.
In what follows we present a protocol with an honest
(non-cheating) authority that utilizes entangled states:
The authority prepares two qutrits that serve as a ballot
in a maximally entangled state |Ω0〉 = 1√3 (|00〉 + |11〉 +
3|22〉). One of the qutrits is sent to the voters. Using
the voting operation Uyes they produce mutually orthog-
onal states associated with mutually exclusive results of
voting. In this way one can guarantee that intermedi-
ate measurements performed individually by voters who
might want to learn an intermediate voting result provide
no information about how the voting has progressed. The
state of the particle seen by the voters is, at all times,
simply a total mixture. This protocol can be directly gen-
eralized to N participants by choosing the ballot state to
be |Ω0〉 = 1√N
∑N−1
k=0 |k〉|k〉 and having Uyes|k〉 = |k+1〉.
There is a possibility of voter collusion in this scheme. If
two voters want to find out how the voters between them
voted (how many total yes votes these voters made) then
the first voter can measure the second particle of the bal-
lot state when he gets it, placing it in one of the states |k〉
and disentangling it from the first particle, and then the
second colluding voter can again measure second ballot
particle when he receives it. By comparing their results,
they can determine the number of yes votes cast by the
people who voted between them. There is a rather high
cost to this type of cheating, however; the result of the
voting as determined by the authority will be completely
random.
Next we shall again consider the case of two voters,
but we shall analyze the DB scheme. Let us start with
the assumption that each of the participants obtains a
ballot represented by a single qubit. In the previous
paragraph we have argued that the system has to be
at least three-dimensional. Although the system of two
qubits is four-dimensional, the DB scheme allows the
users to make only local voting operations, i.e. single-
qubit unitary transformations. The question is, whether
two qubits are sufficient to implement secret voting. Sup-
pose that U0, U1 and V0, V1 are voting operations of the
voters named U and V , respectively. Let us denote by
|Ω0〉 the initial state of the two ballot qubits. The privacy
conditions (1) yield the following system of equations
0 = 〈Ω0|U †0U1 ⊗ I|Ω0〉 = 〈Ω0|I ⊗ V †0 V1|Ω0〉 ; (2)
1 = 〈Ω0|U †0U1 ⊗ V †1 V0|Ω0〉 ; (3)
0 = 〈Ω0|U †0U1 ⊗ V †0 V1|Ω0 ; (4)
0 = 〈Ω0|U †1U0 ⊗ I|Ω0〉 = 〈Ω0|I ⊗ V †1 V0|Ω0〉 . (5)
Due to the fact that U †0U1 and V
†
0 V1 are unitary single-
qubit transformations, they can be expressed as U †0U1 =
I cos ν + i(~m · ~σ) sin ν and V †0 V1 = I cos θ + i(~n · ~σ) sin θ.
It also holds that (U †0U1)
† = U †1U0 and (V
†
0 V1)
† = V †1 V0.
¿From Eqs. (2) and (3) it follows that
cos ν cos θ + sin ν sin θ〈Ω0|~n · ~σ ⊗ ~m · ~σ|Ω0〉 = 1 , (6)
which together with Eq. (4) results in the condition
2 cos ν cos θ = 1. However, combining Eqs.(2) and (5) we
find that cos θ = 0 and cos ν = 0. This is a contradiction
and therefore two-dimensional systems are not sufficient
to implement the DB scheme. One needs at least two
qutrits. Note that in the DB scheme the fairness require-
ment holds, i.e. nobody can learn intermediate results.
To proceed further let us recall the following prop-
erty. If the protocol (|Ω0〉, {Uk}) satisfies the privacy
conditions, then so does the protocol (|Ω′0〉, {U ′k}), where
U ′k = UkV and |Ω′0〉 = (V ⊗N )†|Ω0〉. This means we can
always choose U0 = I, i.e. without the loss of generality
we can assume that Uno = I and Uyes = U . Applying
the privacy conditions from Eq. (1) we obtain equations
〈Ω0|U ⊗ U |Ω0〉 = 0 ;
〈Ω0|U ⊗ I|Ω0〉 = 0 ;
〈Ω0|I ⊗ U |Ω0〉 = 0 ;
〈Ω0|U † ⊗ U |Ω0〉 = 1 . (7)
Our task is to find a solution of this set of equations.
Because U is unitary, its eigenvalues are of the form eiηj
and U =
∑
j e
iηj |j〉〈j|, where |j〉 is the eigenvector cor-
responding to the eigenvalue eiηj . Let us consider the
state |Ω0〉 =
∑
j |αj |2|j〉 ⊗ |j〉, where, again, {|j〉} are
eigenvectors of U . Using this Ansatz the above identi-
ties gives us the following equations
∑
j |αj |2ei2ηj = 0,∑
j |αj |2eiηj = 0, and
∑
j |αj |2 = 1. The last of these
equations is just the normalization condition for the state
|Ω0〉, and is satisfied. We have already shown that a qubit
is not a sufficient resource for quantum voting and larger
dimensional systems have to be sent to both voters. As-
suming d = 3 we find that the equations for parameters
ηj , αj have multiple solutions. Here, however, we will
restrict ourselves to |αj | = 1/
√
d = 1/
√
3. The possible
solutions then form a one-parameter set and among them
is the following one
U = ei2π/3|0〉〈0|+ ei4π/3|1〉〈1|+ ei6π/3|2〉〈2| ;
|Ω0〉 = 1√
3
(|0〉|0〉+ |1〉|1〉+ |2〉|2〉) . (8)
This solution can be easily extended to an arbitrary
number of participants. Let us suppose that there are
N voters and the authority that distributes one qu-
dit (d > N) to each voter. In accordance with the
case of two voters let the authority prepare and dis-
tribute the state |Ω0〉 = 1√d
∑
j |j〉⊗N . The voters will
apply one of the two operations: either Uno = I, or
Uyes = U =
∑
k e
ik2π/d|k〉〈k|, depending on their de-
cision. After performing the voting operations they send
the qubits back to the authority, who now possesses the
state |Ωm〉 = U⊗m ⊗ I⊗(N−m)|Ω0〉 =
∑
k e
imk2π/d|k〉⊗N ,
where m is the number of voters who choose to vote
“yes”, i.e. the result of the voting. Note that this state
contains no information about the particular voter, only
the total number of “yes” votes is recorded. This guar-
antees the privacy of the individual votes. The distin-
guishability of different outcomes (different numbers of
“yes” votes) is guaranteed by the orthogonality condi-
tion i.e. 〈Ωm|Ωm′〉 = δmm′ .
This protocol protects the identity of the voters from
a curious, but not malicious, authority and from other
4voters. We assume that the authority follows the proto-
col, but does whatever he can beyond this to determine
the individual votes. In this case, because the state he
receives contains no information about who voted how,
he can do nothing. If, after the voting, a voter intercepts
a particle from another voter, he will be able to learn
nothing, because any subset of particles has a reduced
density matrix proportional to the identity.
The protocol can also be used in the dinning-
cryptographers problem. It has further uses as well. A
simple generalization of the protocol can be used also for
what was called in Ref. [9] an anonymous survey. Imag-
ine that N people want to determine the total amount
of money they have, but each individual does not want
reveal how much money he or she has. These people use
the same method, except that each person votes “yes” a
number of times corresponding to the number of Euros
(s)he has. In the resulting state, |Ωm〉, m will be equal
to the total number of Euros, but the contributions of
individual partners will be unknown. This is an example
of quantum secure function evaluation [11, 12].
In a sense this voting protocol can be thought of as a
generalization of the classical scheme. However, like its
classical counterpart, it does not completely possess the
properties of the security and the verifiability. In fact, we
have focused our attention mainly on the un-traceability
of voters ( privacy). To achieve a completely secure vot-
ing scheme the protocol has to be improved. One of
the security loopholes is the possibility for voters to vote
more than once. This type of cheating, however, is not
guaranteed to produce the desired result, because the
states |Ωm〉 count only the number of “yes” votes mod-
ulo d. If too many voters vote “yes” too many times, the
number m can become larger than d, and because |Ωm〉
records the number of “yes” votes only modulo d, the
final recorded number m could be small. In fact, even if
there is a subset of cooperating voters it would be diffi-
cult to know what the effect of such cheating would be,
and the voting process would become a strategic game.
In order to prevent voters from registering more than
one vote (a complete non-reusability of ballots) we can
proceed as follows: Besides the qudit from the state |Ω0〉
each of the participants receives two additional “voting”
qudits, one in the state |ψ(θy)〉 and the second one in the
state |ψ(θn)〉. These two qudits represent the “yes” and
the “no” votes, respectively. Both of the states are of the
form |ψ(θ)〉 = 1√
d
∑
k e
ikθ|k〉. The angle θy is equal to
(2lyπ/d)+δ and θn is equal to (2lnπ/d)+δ, where ly and
ln are integers between 0 and d and δ is an angle between
0 and 2π/d. In addition, we assume that (ly − ln)N < d,
where, as before, N is the number of voters. This con-
dition is necessary in order that different voting results
be distinguishable. The integers ly and ln and the angle
δ are not known to the voters. Depending on his (her)
choice the voter combines either |ψ(θy)〉, or |ψ(θn)〉, with
the original ballot particle, i.e. creates a system com-
posed from the ballot and the voting qudits. Then (s)he
performs a two-qudit measurement that is specified by a
set of projectors Pr =
∑
j |j+r〉b〈j+r|⊗|j〉v〈j|, where the
subscript b denotes the ballot qudit while the subscript v
denotes the voting qudit. Registering the outcome r the
voter applies the operation Vr = Ib ⊗
∑
j |j + r〉v〈j| to
the voting qudit and sends both (the ballot and the vot-
ing) qudits back to the authority. The remaining unused
qudit must be kept, or destroyed in order to secure the
privacy of the registered vote. Let us see how this works
in a bit more detail for the first voter. Assuming the
vote “yes” we obtain Pr(
1√
d
∑
k |k〉|ψ(θy)〉|k〉⊗(N−1)) =
1
d
∑
k e
i(k−r)θy |k〉|k−r〉|k〉⊗(N−1). After the “correcting”
unitary operation Vr the N + 1 qudits are in the state
|Ω1〉 = 1√de−irθy
∑
k e
ikθy |k〉⊗(N+1), where the global
phase e−irθy is irrelevant. If my = m the voters voted
“yes” and mn = N −m voters voted “no”, the authority
gets back the state |Ωm〉 = 1√d
∑
k e
ik(myθy+mnθn)|k〉⊗2N .
Here the phase factor can be rewritten as follows
eik(myθy+mnθn) = eikm∆eikNθn , where ∆ = θy − θn =
2π(ly − ln)/d. Because the states
∑
k e
ipk2π/d|k〉⊗2N are
orthogonal for different values of p, for p an integer be-
tween 0 and d − 1, we see that from the state |Ωm〉 the
authority can determine the value of p corresponding to
this state, which is just m(ly − ln). This allows him to
determine m, because he knows both ly and ln. Note
that p should always be a multiple of ly− ln if the voters
are using their proper ballot states. If after measuring
the ballot state, the authority finds a value of p that is
not a multiple of ly − ln, then he knows that someone
has cheated. A voter who wants to vote more than once
is faced with the problem of determining what θy or θn
is, and this cannot be done from just a single state. In
fact, what the voter is faced with is a problem of phase
estimation, and the best he can do is to determine the
phase to within an accuracy of order 1/d. If he makes
an error (illegal operation), the value of ∆ will not, in
general be a multiple of 2π/d, and this will cause the au-
thority to obtain different results for m if the voting pro-
cedure is repeated several times. The choice ly− ln = ±1
maximizes the chance of different results being found if
cheating has occurred, and thereby makes it most likely
that the cheating will be detected. We also note that
the no-cloning theorem makes it impossible for a voter
to simply copy the voting states. Summarizing, we see
that the casting of multiple votes can be prevented by the
use of voting states and repeating the voting procedure
several times in order to make sure that the result is the
same each time. If the results vary, cheating is taking
place, and the results are discarded.
If the authority is malicious as well as curious, one
of the new security problems that arises is that of the
state identification, i.e. verifying whether the initial bal-
lot state is correct, and whether the voting states pro-
vided by the authority are also correct. The authority
could cheat either by sending a ballot state that is a
product state, so that each voter’s particle is decoupled
from all of the others, or by sending voting states that are
different for each voter. In principle, if the authority is
5required to supply a large number of both kinds of states
to the voters, they can verify the correctness of the states
by performing state tomography. A less drastic test is for
the voters to take subsets of ballot particles or subsets
of voting particles corresponding to the same choice (all
yes or all no) and to measure them. For example, a set
of ”yes” voting states can be measured in order to deter-
mine whether the state is completely symmetric or not.
If it is not, then the authority is trying to cheat by send-
ing different voting states to different voters. Another
possibility, at least in regard to the ballot state, is for
the voters to prepare that state by themselves. However,
this is second option is somewhat restrictive, because it
requires that participants (voters) have to meet as the
same place (or they need quantum resources for a re-
mote state preparation). This problem could perhaps be
addressed by having two authorities, one who prepares
the states and one who counts the votes. Here one would
have to assume that they are not both dishonest and co-
operating with each other. Clearly much work remains
to be done.
In summary, we have proposed quantum protocols that
guarantee the anonymity of participants in voting proce-
dures and can be used in several complex communication
tasks. The advantage of quantum voting protocols is that
security that is based on the laws of quantum mechanics
rather than assumptions about computational complex-
ity. Our approach to quantum voting is based on voters
applying local operations to an entangled state, a fea-
ture it shares with the approach proposed by Vaccaro
et al. [9]. As we have noted, the approaches discussed
here are based on entangled states of qudits, while in [9]
particle number entanglement is used. This would sug-
gest that the schemes would lend themselves to different
physical implementations. Within our approach, we have
presented a method of preventing voters from cheating,
that is from casting more than one vote. Hence, for the
attacks discussed here, this scheme can meet two require-
ments for a voting system, privacy and security. The are
still many questions that remain open and deserve fur-
ther detailed investigation. Primarily, it is the analysis
of the security of quantum voting against more sophis-
ticated attacks, such as collaborating parties, the use of
illegal voting operations, and cheating authorities that
deserve further attention. In addition it would be useful
to find physical implementations for some of these pro-
posals for small numbers of voters that might enable a
prototype system to be constructed.
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